Libertad para Daniel Ceballos por una de sus causas, pendiente la segunda

 

Laura Weffer Cifuentes/@lweffer

El alcalde del municipio San Cristóbal, Daniel Ceballos tenía dos causas pendientes con los tribunales venezolanos.

La primera se resolvió ayer  cuando el tribunal 11 de control dictó libertad para el funcionario tachirense luego de que cumpliera la condena de doce meses en prisión. de acuerdo con lo queexplicó uno de sus abogados, Juan Carlos Gutiérrez (@juancgutierrezc):

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El argumento para esta decisión se basó en  el desacato a la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ) que ordenó realizar acciones y utilizar recursos materiales y humanos para evitar que se colocaran obstáculos en la vía pública que impidieran el libre tránsito de las personas y vehículos.

Ahora el destino de Ceballos está en manos del tribunal 15 de juicio. A esta instancia le corresponderá dictaminar si permitirá que el proceso que se le sigue por rebelión civil y agavillamiento se llevará en libertad o por lo el contrario, permanecerá recluido en la cárcel de Ramo Verde.

Ceballos se encuentra tras las rejas desde el 19 de marzo de 2014, fecha en la que fue capturado por el Sebin. Gutiérrez aclaró que esta decisión lo habilita para participar en las elecciones.

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  1. It was interesting that Breyer denilced to join Souter’s dissenting opinion because Breyer concluded that Souter’s standard was insufficiently protective of the need for managerial discretion for reasons of efficiency in management and administration by governmental employers. While that was the fault line that got the most attention, equally resonant, at least for me, was Justice Kennedy’s concern about the need to keep the judicial role within reasonable parameters. If the Ninth Circuit’s opinion had been affirmed, public employers would undoubtedly have tailored their actions to the inevitability of judicial second-guessing of all manner of decisions taken by public employers. The Court was wise to reject that approach.Public employers are already in a far more difficult position than private employers whenever the governmental employer contemplates adverse action against any employee. You could see some of that even in this case, where the DA’s office went out of its way to deny implausibly that it had taken adverse action against Ceballos — a point on which Ceballos was quite likely to more reliable. I suspect that an unstated premise of the Court’s opinion was that union rules (remember that government employment is the only significant area of success that union organizers have enjoyed in quite a long time) combined with due process requirements already impose significant costs, in terms of management’s time and resources, whenever management of a governmental employer is contemplating taking such adverse employment actions. Whenever the costs of an activity increase, it is a pretty good bet that those costs act as a disincentive to engage in it. The result is that management becomes more difficult, problem employees are allowed to remain, and the general efficiency and often the overall morale of the rest of the workforce is adversely impacted. Efficiency is the inevitable loser — and, if you have any doubts, a visit to your local post office or DMV bureau where the impact of this ossified system on employee conduct should put them to rest. In comparison, in the private section, particularly the non-unionized sector, management has a much freer hand, and uses it to nip such problems in the bud, by getting rid of problem employees much sooner. No doubt, on occasion, the real “problem” is not about the employee at all, and mistakes (or worse) are sometimes made. But the costs of adding layers of judicial second-guessing on top of all of that, by constitutionalizing the employment relationship when the government is the employer, must have struck the Court as just too much. And a second unstated but I think real factor here was the Court’s strong desire not to saddle the federal judiciary with such a thankless task, where the courts are already struggling under a heavy case load of Title VII complaints. As to the already existing caseload of employment cases, I think the folk wisdom among judges is that most of them suffer from the twin defects of being both bogus and impossible to settle. No big surprise that the Court’s majority was not willing to add a new constitutional cause of action that would just have made that problem bigger.

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